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Chapter 1: Health Outcomes and Policy in India 
1.1 Introduction 
In his eponymous review of trends in health outcomes in the world Deaton (2013), referred to “The 
Great Escape” that occurred in most countries in the aftermath of World War II. By this he meant that, 
in the decades since 1945, the quality of life in most countries, but particularly in low-income 
countries, improved considerably – inter alia people lived longer, children were taller and better 
nourished and went to school, the incidence of mothers who did not survive child birth fell, family 
size grew smaller as mothers had fewer babies, partly because their children were less likely to die in 
childhood but partly because more educated mothers recognised the importance of investing in the 
health, diet, and education of their children.  Furthermore, this has all happened without there being a 
commensurate narrowing of income differentials between rich and poor countries. 
 The improvement in health outcomes in several countries of the world can be ascribed to 
several factors. First, and foremost, were medical advances, particularly improvements in public 
health.  These advances enabled countries to bypass the constraints of economic development by 
achieving health outcomes which, in an earlier age, were the preserve of much richer countries. As 
Deaton (2013) observed, although India’s per-capita income in the middle of the 21st century was no 
higher than of Scotland’s in the mid-nineteenth century, it had achieved a life expectancy which was 
higher than that of Scotland’s in 1945. In a similar vein, as Gwatkin (1980) reported, countries such as 
Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka saw annual increases in life expectancy of more than 
year in the 10 years around the 1950s. 
 Leading the charge against early deaths in developing countries was the chemical assault on 
malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Accompanying this, were programs of mass vaccination of children in 
Europe against tuberculosis and The WHO’s Expanded Program on Immunisation, launched in 1974, 
vaccinated children against diphtheria, whooping cough, and tetanus, as well as extending coverage 
against tuberculosis, polio, and smallpox. The UNICEF, as a major sponsor of children’s welfare, 
extended its remit to sponsoring clean water and sanitation. Another important innovation in the fight 
against early mortality was the discovery, in the refugee camps of Bangladesh and India in 1973, of 
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Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT): this was a solution of glucose and salt in water and was found to be 
very effective in preventing the dehydration that killed children with diarrhoea. Under the aegis of 
international agencies and governments, these medical and technical advances could be implemented 
even in countries which might have had limited capacity to do so themselves. 
 Complementing these medical and public health innovations was a greater awareness, 
instilled in parents by spread of education, of their importance for the health of children and of the 
increased ability to seek medical attention engendered by growing prosperity. In terms of its effect on 
children’s well-being, most studies focus on the education of the mother and hypothesise that the 
higher the mother’s education, the better would be her feeding and care practices towards her children 
(Caldwell, 1979 and 1986; Hobcraft, 1993). So, as pointed out by Deaton (2013), the major drivers of 
health advances are, on the one hand, income and, on the other, medical innovation and treatment 
with education mediating between them by improving the effectiveness of both.  In assessing the 
relative contributions of these two broad sets of factors, Preston (1975) estimated that the bulk of the 
increase in life expectancy between the 1930s and the 1960s was brought about through medical 
innovation and public health improvements with about a quarter being due to rising living standards. 
<Table 1.1> 
 Table 1.1 shows the life expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate (the number of 
babies who died before their first birthday per 1,000 births), IMR, for a selection of South Asian 
countries (India Pakistan, and Bangladesh) as well as for two emerging countries, Brazil and China.  
An important point that emerges from this table is that Bangladesh, which in 2015, with a per-capita 
GDP in constant US dollars of $972, was considerably poorer than India, whose 2015 per-capita GDP 
in constant US dollars was $1,758, had, nevertheless, a higher life expectancy than India (72 versus 
68 years) as well as a lower IMR (28.2 versus 34.6) in 2015. The second point to emerge from Table 
1.1 is how far ahead China has pulled ahead of India both in terms of life expectancy and in terms of 
IMR. In 1960, there was only a three year gap between China and India in terms of life expectancy 
(44 versus 41 years); by 2015, this gap was eight years (76 versus 68 years). Although information for 
China’s IMR was not available for 1960, the IMR in China in 2015 (8.5 infant deaths per 1,000 births) 
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was less than one-fourth that of India’s 34.6 infant deaths.  So, while all the countries shown in Table 
1.1 evidenced considerable improvement in two important health indicators (life expectancy and 
IMR) between 1960 and 2015, these achievements were not constrained by economic performance – 
China was a poorer country than India in 1960 (per-capita GDP in constant prices of $191 in China 
versus $304 for India) and Bangladesh was a poorer country than India in 2015 but neither fact 
prevented these countries from recording superior health outcomes than India by the middle of the 21st 
century.1 
   Indeed, Dreze and Sen (2013) commented that India’s achievements, relative to other 
countries, with respect to national income and to social indicators suggested that the country had been 
improving its position in terms of per-capita income but slipping in terms of social achievements. 
Bangladesh with half of India’s per-capita income has exceeded India’s achievement for not just life 
expectancy and IMR (as noted above) but also for immunisation rates for children, child 
undernourishment, and girls’ schooling.2  In 2014, public expenditure on health in India was just 1.4% 
of its GDP and this in contrast to 3.1% in China, 3.8% in Brazil, and 7.8% in the European Union. 
Another feature of note in India is that the proportion of public expenditure on health in GDP was 
substantially less than the proportion of total expenditure on health in GDP: in 2014, India spent 4.7% 
of its GDP on health care but only 1.4% of its GDP on public health care.  This meant that, in 2014, of 
total health expenditure in India, only 30% was spent on public health care the remainder being on 
private health services. By contrast, 55% of total health care expenditure in China (with a proportion 
of total health expenditure in GDP of 5.6%) was on public health care. 
 A consequence of the small share of expenditure on public health care is that India’s health 
care system is dominated by the private sector.  As Jilani et al. (2009) observe, lack of public 
provision has resulted in the emergence of a large unregulated and urban centric curative private 
health sector which serves about 80% of health needs. In the absence of any comprehensive health 
insurance coverage and increasing cost of health care more than 40% of all patients admitted to 
hospital have to borrow money or sell assets, including inherited property and farmland, to cover 
                                                     
1 All figures from Development Data Group, World Bank. 
2 Dreze and Sen (2013) 
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expenses, and 25% of farmers are driven below the poverty line by the costs of their medical care 
(Peters, et al. 2001).  The National Family Health Survey II showed that only 23.5% of urban 
residents and 30.6% of rural residents chose to visit a government health facility as their main source 
of health care services (IIPS, 2000).  
 According to a High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) of the erstwhile Planning Commission of 
India, in 2011, the private sector accounted for 93% of all hospitals (up from 7% in 1947), 64% of all 
beds, 80%-85% of all doctors, 80% of all out-patients, and 57% of all in-patients (HLEG, 2011, 
p.182).   The HLEG (2011) went on to note that private entrepreneurship in 2011 covered all area of 
health provision including health insurance, health care training, and the manufacture of health care 
equipment. While not decrying private sector involvement in health care per se, the HLEG (2011) 
deplored the “lack of a regulatory framework [which] has led also to cost escalation and variable 
quality in the services provided by this sector” (HLEG, 2011, p.182).3  
 A consequence of the private sector being the main provider of health services in India, 
combined with a lack of regulation of the prices charged and the service quality provided by this 
sector, means that Indians face high proportions of ‘out-of-pocket’ (OOP) expenses – by which is 
meant the amount paid by patients (or their families) to the health provider out of their own resources4 
- in total health expenses compared to patients in other countries: 61.7% compared to global average 
of 20.5%.5 Per-capita health expenditure in India is around ₹3,826 of which patients have to spend 
₹2,394 from their resources. In consequence, one in five urban households and one in four rural 
households are forced to borrow or to sell assets in order to fund in-patient hospital care (EPW, 2017). 
All this makes a mockery of the Indian Government’s aspirations to provide Universal Health Care 
                                                     
3 A particularly egregious case of excessive billing was the ₹16 lakhs (approximately, £14,000) charged by a 
private hospital to the Aadya family for a 15-day in-patient treatment of their 7-year old daughter for dengue. 
The treatment was unsuccessful and the girl died. The family was, among other things, billed for 611 syringes, 
1,546 pairs of gloves, and to different kinds of the same drug, meropenem, one costing ₹500 the other costing 
₹3,100 (Ghosh, 2017). 
4 That is net of any government subsidy or third party insurance. 
5 UN India (2015) 
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(UHC) so that all its citizens can obtain the health services they need without suffering financial 
hardship.6  
 The next section examines OOP expenses in greater detail both with respect to IHP and out-
patient (OP) care but before that we refer briefly to the illnesses that afflict India. Communicable 
diseases - diarrhoeal disease, malaria, hepatitis, filariasis, typhoid, influenza, to name a few – account 
for 36% of morbidity in India. Alongside these, there is the spread of “rich person’s” diseases like 
hypertension, diabetes, cardio-vascular diseases. Overlaying this is the spread of vector-borne 
diseases7 most notably dengue, chikungunya, zika.  Many of these illnesses require preventive 
measures like clean water, better sanitation, improved hygiene, vector control but, as the following 
pages will make clear, a major flaw of health policy in India is that it is focused on treatment of 
illnesses rather than their prevention. This results in a strong bias away from public health measures to 
prevent disease to the treatment of disease after they have occurred. Overlaying this is the fact that the 
providers of treatment are mostly in the private sector, catering essentially to an urban unregulated 
with respect to the prices they care and the quality of service they offer.   
1.2 Out-of-Pocket Health Expenses 
 Selvaraj and Karan (2012) analysed OOP expenses for in-patient  (that is, involving a stay in 
hospital: hereafter, IPT) and out-patient (hereafter, OPT) treatment using unit level data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), conducted by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), for 
the years 2004-05 and 2009-10. The CES provided details of IPT and OPT health expenses and this 
showed for, 2009-10, that the average per-capita monthly OOP expenditure was ₹68 and this 
comprised ₹22 (32%) in IPT and ₹46 (68%) in OPT expenditure. Thus of, of total OOP expenditure, 
one-third was spent on IPT and two-thirds on OPT treatment. Within the total of OOP expenditure, 
the amount spent on drugs (that is, from IPT and OPT treatment) was ₹47 implying that such 
                                                     
6 And, indeed, mocks Article 47 of the Indian Constitution which directs that “The State shall regard the raising 
of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among 
its primary duties.” 
7 Vectors are living organisms that can transmit infectious diseases between humans or from animals to 
humans. Many of these vectors are bloodsucking insects, which ingest disease-producing microorganisms 
during a blood meal from an infected host (human or animal) and later inject it into a new host during their 
subsequent blood meal. Mosquitoes are the best known disease vector. Others include ticks, flies, sandflies, 
fleas, triatomine bugs and some freshwater aquatic snails (WHO, 2017).) 
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expenditure, at nearly 70% of total OOP expenses, was the largest single item of expenditure on 
health. 
 In 2009-10, households’ OOP expenditure comprised 5.7% of their total spending.  The 
proportion of household expenditure that went towards OOP expenses rose with the affluence of 
households. Only 3.7% of the total expenditure of the poorest households (that is, in the lowest 
quintile of monthly household per-capita consumer expenditure, hereafter HPCE) went towards OOP 
spending while, for the richest households (that is in the highest quintile of HPCE), this proportion 
was 7.2%.  
 Catastrophic health expenditure is defined as OOP spending that exceeds a certain proportion 
of a household’s total spending with the consequence that the household is ‘impoverished’ by the 
illness.  It is conventional to describe a household’s OOP expenditure as ‘catastrophic’ if it exceeds 
10% of the total of its expenditure. Under this definition, Selvaraj and Karan (2012) found that, in 
2009-10, 13.7% of all households in India incurred catastrophic OOP expenses.  It is interesting to 
compare these results with those for China. There, too, 13% of households in 2012 incurred 
catastrophic health expenditure but, unlike India, catastrophic OOP rates in China were inversely 
related to the households’ economic level – poorer households had the highest rates (15.8%) and the 
richest households had the lowest rates (10.7%).8  In India, however, catastrophic OOP rates were 
positively related to the households’ economic level – poorer households had the lowest rates (7.7% 
in 2009-10) and the richest households had the highest rates (22.5% in 2009-10).9      
<Table 1.2 and 1.3> 
 71st Round (January–June 2014) of the specialist Health module of India’s National Sample 
Survey (NSS), which surveyed 65,743 households and selected persons therein (hereafter 71st NSS), 
provided information on how OOP expenses towards IPT and OPT treatment was funded: (i) from 
household income/saving (ii) borrowing (iii) help from friends and relatives. Table 1.2 shows that, 
considering all persons who availed of IPT treatment, 74% financed OPP expenses from 
income/saving (that is, were self-sufficient) while the remainder had to borrow (20%) or rely on help 
                                                     
8 Li et al. (2012), Table 1. 
9 Selvaraj and Karan (2012), Table 4. 
7 
 
from friends and relatives (4%). Table 1.3 shows that, considering all persons who availed of OPT 
treatment, 96% financed OOP expenses from income/saving (that is, were self-sufficient) while the 
remainder had to borrow (2.8%) or rely on help from friends and relatives (1.3%).10  
 This finding lends an alternative interpretation to the term ‘catastrophic’.  OOP expenses 
associated with IPT treatment may be infrequent but, when they occur, they are large and cannot 
easily be accommodated within the household’s budget. On the other hand, the drip of OOP expenses 
associated with OPT treatment may be incessant but they are not large enough to require the 
household to stray outside its budget.  The analogy is that IPT expenses are like hurricanes which, 
though occasional, flatten houses while OPT expenses are like an incessantly strong wind which 
inconveniences but does not destroy.   Consequently, the remainder of this discussion is cast in terms 
of IPT treatment. 
 The degree of self-sufficiency in meeting OOP expenses for IPT treatment, however, varied 
with social group. As Table 1.2 shows, the most self-sufficient were those in the non-Muslim Upper 
Classes (NMUC) who were able to meet as much as 80% of OOP expenses from income or saving 
while, at the other extreme, the least self-sufficient were those belonging to the Scheduled Castes (SC) 
who were able to meet only 70% of OOP expenses from income or saving. The degree of self-
sufficiency also varied with the type of state that persons using IPT services lived in – only 70% of 
IPT users in ‘forward’ states, compared to 79% in ‘backward’ states were self-sufficient. This may be 
explained partly by the fact that IPT expenses in forward states were higher than in backward states 
(₹19,159 versus ₹14,195, annually: 71st NSS) and partly by the fact that opportunities for borrowing 
were better in the former type of state than in the latter. Table 1.2 shows also that the degree of self-
sufficiency was higher for those IPT users living in urban (77%), compared to those in rural (72%), 
areas.     
1.3 Publicly-Financed Health Care 
 The defraying of health care costs could result from either payments received from private or 
government insurance schemes. Currently, the Indian government funds a number of insurance 
                                                     
10 The 71st NSS also identified two other sources of finance: sale of assets; other. However, the combined 
contribution from these two sources to OOP expenses for IHP care was less than 2% and they are, therefore, 
omitted from Tables 1.2 and 1.3. 
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schemes covering an estimated population of 181 million. These are: Employee State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS) covering 60 million; the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) covering 3 
million; and the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) – literally “National Health Insurance 
Program” - covering 118 million persons (UN India, 2015). 
 The ESIS was created by an Act of Parliament in 1948 to serve the needs of employees, 
whose monthly income was below a specified threshold (currently ₹15,000) in the ‘organised’ 
sector.11  As Duggal (2015) observes, in terms of size – with 151 hospitals, 32,349 beds, and 20,346 
medical personnel – it rivals the medical facilities offered by the army and the railways. The CGHS 
provides health care to three million central government employees (current or retired) and their 
dependents. The package of benefits is generous, covering in-patient and out-patient care, with no 
exclusions for pre-existing illnesses and with no-cap or co-payment. As Grover (2014) has argued, 
this results in a double moral hazard: beneficiaries overuse expensive care since they have no 
incentive to take preventative measures, like leading a healthy life-style, while hospitals, assured that 
their bills will be paid, have an incentive to supply expensive care. 
 The largest governmental insurance scheme is, however, the RSBY launched in 2008 with the 
aim of defraying the health care costs of ‘below the poverty line’ (BPL) persons and their families. 
These persons, working in the unorganised sector, included those employed in the most menial of 
occupations: street vendors, rag-pickers, rickshaw drivers, domestic workers.  Under the RSBY, every 
target family, with coverage limited to five family members, would receive ₹30,000 to access IPT 
services in accredited hospitals with pre-existing conditions covered.  The scheme is funded by the 
central and state governments and managed by public and private insurance companies - of which, 
currently, there are four public and seven private companies – chosen on the basis of competitive 
bidding.12  In the financial year 2016-17, 15 states, involving nearly 460 districts out of a total of 620,  
had introduced variants of such tax-funded insurance, with a total enrolment of 36.3 million families, 
                                                     
11 For analytical purposes, the organised sector comprises the entire public sector and private sector enterprises 
employing more than 10 workers.  On this basis, only 16% of India’s workforce was in the organised sector 
(Joshi, 2016). The ESIS covers that part of the organised sector comprising private sector enterprises employing 
more than 10 workers 
12 For details of how the scheme works see http://www.rsby.gov.in/how_works.aspx (accessed 31 December 
2017) 
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from whom14.3 million had been treated in hospital, with services delivered by 4,926 empanelled 
hospitals (Phillip, 2017).13  One of the reasons that some states did not participate is that they already 
had state-financed health insurance schemes which were more generous than the RSBY.  Most 
notable of these were Maharashtra and the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil 
Nadu. 
 A crucial requirement for a household to get a RBSY card is that it should be a BPL 
household.  On the basis of a “BPL census” conducted by the Government of India, each household is 
assigned a poverty score based on its profile. Based on these scores, a government-determined cut off 
point (termed the BPL cut off line) is used to separate BPL from ‘above poverty line’ (APL) 
households. The last BPL survey was done in 2002 and scores based on this were used for RSBY 
registration. All the households listed in the BPL category were informal sector workers since any 
household that had even a single regular salaried, or formal sector, worker was considered to be an 
APL household.  The beneficiaries from RSBY belong to different caste and religious groups. In 
terms of caste, the broad division is between upper-caste Hindus, Hindus from the Other Backward 
Classes (OBC), and the Scheduled Castes (SC), the latter comprising the formerly ‘untouchable’ 
castes.  In terms of religion, the broad distinction is between Hindus and Muslims. 
 A popular theme in the literature on policy making is the idea of ‘capture’. When industry is 
regulated, it attempts to “capture” the regulator to make him act in its interest.  Lobbyists attempt to 
capture legislators and pay them to ask questions on their behalf.  In a similar vein, desirable policy 
initiatives are sought to be captured by influential groups. RSBY cards are no exception. 
 The RSBY poses two barriers: the first associated with getting a card, even though one might 
be formally entitled to one, and the second associated with using a card even though one might be in 
possession of one.  In this context, Borooah et al. (2016) showed that while getting a card in UP was 
essentially barrier free, except on grounds of bureaucratic penetration, in Maharashtra, those higher up 
the income ladder, and those in higher social groups were significantly more likely to have a card than 
                                                     
13 Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, 
Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. The number of empanelled hospitals has fallen 
from 7,865 in 2009-10 to 4,926 in 2016-17 and the number of enrolled families has fallen from 41.3 million in 
2015-16 to 36.3 million in 2016-17 (Phillip, 2017).  
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those on the lowest rung economically and socially. The same is true of usage. Having got a card, it 
was the better off sections of card holders in Maharashtra who were more likely to use them. 
 An unfortunate feature of Indian public life is that the spectre of corruption always looms 
over public policy ready to exploit any loopholes that the new policy initiative might have to offer. 
Khera (2017) refers to the various types of fraud inherent in major welfare programs like the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), the Mid-Day Meal 
(MDM) scheme, Social Security Pensions (SSP), and the Public Distribution System (PDS). These 
may be broadly categorised as “eligibility fraud,” “identity fraud,” and “quantity fraud.”  
 “Eligibility fraud” refers to the fraudulent inclusion of persons who do not meet the eligibility 
criteria, for example, in the case of the RBSY, by falsely representing oneself as a BPL family. 
“Identity fraud” refers to cases where a person’s benefits are falsely claimed by another: for example, 
a RSBY card could be issued in the name of a non-existent person or dead person or getting two cards 
when they are entitled to only one.  “Quantity fraud” takes the form of eligible persons receiving less 
than their entitlements, for instance by hospitals supplying sub-standard care at inflated prices or, in 
the case of the PDS by forcing customers to sign off on more than the quantities received or, with 
MDM, it could refer to dilution of prescribed nutrition norms.  As Borooah (2016) showed with 
reference to rural India, there is hardly an economic activity in Indian villages that is not prey to 
corrupt practices and it is conceivable that these affect the operation of the RSBY as well. For 
example, after analysing expenditure patterns of BPL households in Maharashtra, Ghosh (2014) 
showed that more than half of allegedly BPL households were not in fact poor. This finding resonated 
with the conclusions of other studies like Ram et al. (2009) and Dreze and Khera (2010) and raised 
questions about the conception and implementation of the BPL procedures to identify poor 
households.  
 There is also the question of whether RSBY – and state-sponsored insurance schemes in 
general – has succeeded in reducing OOP payments of poor households. .  After analysing National 
Sample Survey ‘Consumer Expenditure Surveys’ for 1999-2000, 2004-05, and 2011-12, Karan et al. 
(2017) concluded that the RSBY has not provided any significant financial protection to poor 
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households. This is a surprising finding given that the RSBY subsidises the IPT treatment of BPL 
families up to ₹30,000.   
 First, there is the problem, discussed above about identifying poor households though, in this 
regard, the government intends improving its identification methodology by using the 2013 Socio-
Economic and Caste Census.  Second, there is the problem of awareness. Ghosh (2014) in a study of 
Maharashtra found that less than a third of the 6,000 households interviewed were aware of the 
RSBY. This was partly due to the low-key approach to spreading awareness, engendered by the fear 
that a more pro-active approach might lead the system to be swamped by excessive demand.  Partly it 
was also due to the agencies responsible for implementing the scheme that the costs of enrolment 
were greater than the prices they had tendered and, in consequence, it was more economic to leave 
large swathes unenrolled.  
 Third, there is the possibility that many hospitals turn away RSBY patients either because it 
was not remunerative or because of concerns about bureaucratic delays in receiving payment.  
Devadasan et al. (2013), in their study of the functioning of the RSBY in Gujarat, cited cases of 
doctors not seeing RSBY patients with non-surgical conditions or of hospitals demanding advance 
payment from RSBY patients – even though the scheme was meant to be cashless – on the grounds 
that insurance companies paid with delay.  Some of the empanelled providers also asked patients to 
purchase expensive medicines and tests from elsewhere. 
 Indeed, the RSBY has been setback by the fact that the number of empanelled hospitals has 
fallen from 7,865 in 2009-10 to 4,926 in 2016-17.  Phillip (2017) quotes a public health expert as 
saying "Many private hospitals signed up hoping to benefit from a captive market. However, since the 
programme was launched in 2008-09, market coverage increased only marginally and there hasn't 
been any revision in payment rates to providers. There are several reports of delayed payments and 
deductions in hospital bills. Private hospitals are finding the business less lucrative and are gradually 
withdrawing from the scheme". 
1.4 Regulating Private Medicine  
 An important objective of any health policy is ensuring that persons get the health care they 
need without having to bankrupt themselves.  It is with this thought that the public financed health 
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insurance schemes, discussed in the previous section, were designed.  However, all the current 
schemes cover only stay in hospital (that, IPT treatment) and not outpatient care.  The irony is that, on 
average, only a third of OOP expenditure on health is for IPT treatment - covered, however, 
imperfectly, by public-financed health insurance – and two-thirds on OPT treatment which is 
uncovered.  Moreover, spending on drugs accounted, on average, for 68% of OOP expenditure and 
75% of the OOP expenditure of households in the lowest consumption quintile.  Neither of these two 
basic features of health spending in India is taken cognisance of by public financed health insurance 
schemes. 
 There is also another difficulty noted by Rao (2017).  Inflexible health budgets, there is 
tension between the prevention of disease and its treatment. Through public health insurance schemes, 
mostly notably RSBY but also including several similar state-specific schemes, both central and state 
governments have nailed their colours firmly to the mast of ‘treatment’ with ‘prevention’ as the 
Cinderella of India’s health system.  Rao (2014) observed that: “While states initiated tax-based 
tertiary insurance schemes in active collaboration with the private sector, they did not strengthen 
primary health-care, promote prevention, and establish a referral system. Nor was there adequate 
investment in expanding the services and quality of public sector hospitals to enlarge access to 
affordable or free care” (p. 24). 
 The upshot is that, in the context of health care, the government has increasingly become a 
buyer, rather than a supplier, of health services using its resources to finance the IPT care in private 
hospitals for persons in eligible groups.  Even in schemes where it has a supply-side presence these 
are withering away as its clientele demand referral to private hospitals. As noted earlier, the ESIS 
rivals the Army and the Railways in the scale of its medical facilities the occupancy rates in its 
hospitals are woefully low: the occupancy rate in the largest ESIS hospital, the 700-bed Mahatma 
Gandhi Mission Hospital in Mumbai was only 32%. In 2009-10, the largest ESIS hub in Mumbai, 
treated 52,203 outpatients in its facilities in contrast to the 129,447 ESIS members who were treated 
by private doctors serving on the its panel of approved physicians  (Duggal, 2015).  Nor is the 
situation different with CGHS: this functions largely as a conduit for referring its members to private 
hospitals and then reimburses them after their treatment is complete (Grover, 2014). 
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 The result in India is that the private sector has become the dominant provider of health care 
with 70% of OPT, and 60% of IPT, care with 80% of medical specialists working for private sector 
institutions (Rao, 2017, p. xvii). In addition to this, the various state-sponsored insurance schemes 
means there is a close partnership between government, as purchaser, as private hospitals, as 
providers of health care. Given the deficiencies of private sector health care, discussed below, the fact 
that people prefer private to public care is more due to being deterred by sub-standard public hospitals 
and less to being attracted by high-quality private care. 
 Private health care providers in India come in three types (Radwan, 2005; Jilani et al. 2008):  
1. Rural Medical Providers (RMP. RMPs are unqualified medical practitioners and include those 
versed in Indian medicine: Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani, Siddha, and Homeopathy which are 
collectively represented by a ministry (AYUSH) in the national government.  Rural Indians 
do not have access to qualified doctors, not least because such doctors prefer to practice in 
towns and cities rather than in rural areas. Consequently, people in rural areas rely on RMPs 
to treat illnesses: he/she is available all the time, charges very little, treats patients with 
courtesy and respect, and, within a limited sphere of routine ailments is effective (Radwan, 
2005).  
Because of this grave shortage of doctors in rural areas, and the relative effectiveness of 
RMPs, the Indian government is reported to be considering a proposal to allow RMPs to 
become qualified doctors after successfully completing a short bridging course at a medical 
college.14  According to the Director of the Liver Foundation in Calcutta, which trains RMPs 
in the state of West Bengal in methods of modern medicine:  “They offer a vital service to 
people who have nothing else. Instead of laughing at them our training helps to improve the 
work they do” (Dhillon, 2017). 15  
                                                     
14 Safi (2017). Those who complain about this “short cut” to becoming a doctor, protest too much: in urban 
areas and rural areas, 58.4% and 18.8% of those claiming to be allopathic doctors had medical qualifications 
yielding a national average of 42.7%. To put it differently, 57.3% of those in India claiming to be allopathic 
doctors did not have medical qualifications (Anand and Fan, 2016, Bansal, 2016). 
15 See Sharma (2015) and Balsari et al. (2017) for detailed accounts of such conversion courses and training 
programs. 
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2.  Qualified Medical Practitioners. These run their own clinics, sometimes with a nursing home 
attached usually with 30 or fewer beds. Radwan (2005), using data for Bihar, shows that 
charges in this sector are considerably higher than those charged by RMPs: ₹30-50 versus ₹5-
25 for outpatient consultations and ₹150 versus ₹110 for vaccinations.   
3. Multi-speciality corporate sector hospitals. These are located in larger towns and metropolitan 
conurbations, are staffed by highly qualified (often foreign-trained) doctors, and they 
dominate the upper end of the market providing services that only the affluent can afford.  As 
Sengupta and Nundy (2005) note, medical tourism has become a big earner for Indian 
hospitals with visitors from the United Kingdom, Europe, and North America arriving for 
quick, efficient, and cheap coronary bypasses or orthopaedic procedures.16 
 The formal for-profit sector encompasses the most diverse group of practitioners and 
facilities. At the top are elite hospitals whose services are financially out of reach of the poor. Small 
private clinics and nursing homes are within the reach of middle-class households but even their 
moderate costs can be financially crippling.  
 As Radwan (2005) observes, the issue at stake is the India’s private health sector is that it has 
grown without any governmental oversight or regulation and this has resulted in a proliferation of 
facilities in urban areas, services of variable quality, undue emphasis on surgical procedures and 
medical tests, variable charges, and lack of integration with public health issues such as disease 
prevention. The growth of this sector has been facilitated by the government providing the sector with 
tax exemptions and prime land at subsidised prices, making private health care a profitable area of 
investment (Jilani et al., 2008).  These are all important issues which the central and state 
governments must grapple with if the private health sector in India is to improve its performance.        
 However, as the recent experience of the state of Karnataka, detailed in Vasan et al. (2017), 
shows, the regulation of the private health care system is fraught with difficulty. On June 23 2017, the 
state government introduced the Karnataka Private Medical Establishments (Amendments) Bill 2017 
in the Assembly on 13 June 2017which sought to include a charter of patient rights, regulate cost, and 
                                                     
16 A shoulder operation, which would cost £10,000 in the UK if done privately or would involve a long wait if 
done on the NHS, would be done for £1,800 within 10 days of contact. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3879371.stm  (accessed 4 January 2018). 
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set setting up district-level grievance redressal committees. The act also sought to prohibit private 
hospitals from withholding dead bodies against payment of dues and demanding advance payment in 
medical emergencies. The private medical establishments in Karnataka opposed the Bill in toto 
including the inclusion of grievance redressal mechanism and the patient rights charter. A campaign 
of agitation and protest by these establishments then led to the final Bill being greatly diluted. Cost 
control was to be only applied to public health insurance patients and grievance redressal was made 
more difficult. 
 Control of the private health sector is also being attempted in West Bengal. Under the West 
Bengal Clinical Establishments (Registration, Regulation and Transparency) Bill, passed in the state 
Assembly on in March 2017, the state will set up a regulatory commission to oversee private 
healthcare facilities, deciding what they can charge, deal with complaints from people receiving 
treatment, and make hospitals pay compensation to patients whose complaints were upheld.  The most 
salient feature of the new bill is formation of the West Bengal Clinical Establishment Regulatory 
Commission which will not only work as the watchdog body but will also address complaints from 
patients and order action against private institutions (Chatterjee, 2017).  Needless to say, the Bill has 
raised a storm of protest from the private health sector lobby which labelled these measures ‘populist’ 
and claimed they would only serve to deter private investment in hospitals; the lobby has promised to 
challenge the Bill in court (Majumdar, 2017).  
1.5 Health Workers in India    
 The previous section hinted at the bi-polar nature of India’s health care system. Large towns 
and metropolitan areas are host to several hospitals and offer, to those who can afford it, world-class 
health care. On the other hand, people in rural India live far removed from health care centres and 
have to rely, instead, on traditional medicine through RMPs.  Although India has over 400 medical 
colleges, with an annual intake of 50,000 students for the MBBS courses, it has only six doctors and 
13 nurses and midwives per 10,000, against the WHO’s recommendation  of a minimum 23 health 
workers per 10,000 persons (WHO, 2011).  The great proportion of this limited health workforce is is 
in urban areas. Almost 74% of India‘s doctors are concentrated in cities, where only 28% of the 
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population resides, rendering the majority of the rural population (72% of total) unable to access 
services of trained doctors without extreme difficulty (Paliwal, 2014). 
 Indian medical colleges train doctors in tertiary care, encourage them to acquire 
specialisations, preferably abroad, and then to climb the professional ladder by working in their 
specialist areas in quality hospitals.  Working in rural areas is the complete antithesis of such 
ambitions. Rural life is alien to doctors trained in cities; there is little opportunity for professional 
development; and a shortage of resources in badly-resourced primary and community health centres 
robs  the efforts of even socially-conscious doctors of effectiveness.  
 The rural health-care system comprises three tiers. At the top are the community health 
centres (CHC) which are meant to have four medical specialists (surgeon, physician, gynaecologist, 
and paediatrician) supported by 21 paramedics, 30 beds, and an operating theatre and X-ray room.  
Just below the community health centres are the primary health centres (PHC) which should have a 
doctor supported by 14 paramedics and other staff. The PHC are the first point of contact between ill 
persons and doctors who, in the case of unresolved ailments, refers patients to the CHC. At the very 
bottom are sub-centres staffed by trained health workers with and auxiliary nurse midwives with each 
centre covering up to 5,000 persons (Sharma, 2015). 
 Central to the functioning of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare’s National Rural 
Health Mission (NHRM), now subsumed under the National Health Mission (NHM) which includes 
urban areas, is to provide accessible, affordable, and quality health care to India’s rural population. 
Notwithstanding these well-meaning policy initiatives, and although the number of health facilities 
has risen in the past decade, workforce shortages are substantial and there is an acute shortage of 
qualified medical personnel in rural areas. The consequence is that both the availability and the 
quality of health services obtainable in rural areas suffer. 
 The lack of medical personnel in rural areas is quantified succinctly by Sharma (2015): “As of 
March 31, 2015, more than 8% of 25,300 primary health centres in the country were without a doctor, 
38% were without a laboratory technician, and 22% had no pharmacist. Nearly 50% of posts for 
female health assistants and 61% for male health assistants remain vacant. In community health 
centres, the shortfall is huge - surgeons (83%), obstetricians and gynaecologists (76%), physicians 
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(83%), and paediatricians (82%). Even in health facilities where doctors, specialists, and paramedics 
have been posted, their availability remains in question because of high rates of absenteeism” (p. 
2381).  Indian 
 Nor is the urban-rural divide the only source of inequality with respect to medical facilities. 
There is also considerable inequality between different states of India, and between districts, with 
more prosperous parts securing the lion’s share of medical facilities.  Anand and Fan (2016) define 
the concentration of health workers in a state as the ratio of the number of health workers (allopathic 
doctors, AYUSH doctors, Dentists, Nurses and Midwives, ancillary health workers) in the state to the 
total number of health workers in the country, expressed as a percentage. On this basis, the states with 
the highest concentration of health workers were: Maharashtra (13.7%); Uttar Pradesh (10.8%); West 
Bengal (9.4%); Andhra Pradesh (7.8%); Tamil Nadu (6.7 %); Kerala (6.1%); and Karnataka (5.3%).  
Bringing up the rear on mainland India  were: the North-Eastern states (Arunachal Pradesh, 0.14%; 
Meghalaya, 0.17%; Tripura, 0.17%; Mizoram, 0.25%; Manipur, 0.27%; Nagaland, 0.26%; 
Assam,1.9%).    
 A similar analysis was done by Anand and Fan (2016) with respect to districts in India. The 
district with the highest density of health workers was Chandigarh (484 per 100,000 population) while 
the district with the lowest density of health workers was South Garo Hills in Meghalaya (11 per 
100,000 population).  If districts were ranked by the density of health workers, the largest number of 
districts in the bottom 30 of these was in the north-east of India. On the other hand, among the highest 
30 districts, eight were in Kerala and another eight were in Delhi. 
1.6 The Way Forward     
    There are at least six  sets of issues with regard to improving the quantity and quality of 
health services, and ipso facto improving health outcomes, in India.   
1. The first is the amount of resources earmarked for health needs to increase.  The point was 
made earlier in the chapter that public spending on health in India, at 1.4% of GDP, was 
amongst the lowest in the world.  The National Health Policy for 2017, hereafter NHP, 
proposes to raise this 2.5% (NHP, 2017) with health care being financed, as earlier, through 
general taxation. 
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2.  The second set of issues is the use of health resources in a fair and just manner and, in 
particular to address complaints relating to egregious health outcomes. Predominant in this set 
is oversight and regulation of the health provision by the private sector. This is, has been for 
some time, and is likely to remain so, the main vehicle for delivering health care in India and 
meets 80% of the country’s health needs (Jilani et al. 2008).  To date, such regulation has 
been attempted only in West Bengal and in Karnataka.  Both states have non-BJP 
governments and, given the confrontational nature of Indian politics, for this reason oversight 
and regulation might not find favour with the central government.  That would be unfortunate 
since there is a crying need for a national policy of regulating the private health sector. Nor is 
this an outlandish idea. The UK’s National Health Service also has a ‘watchdog’ in the form 
of a body, set up in 2004, responsible for authorising, monitoring and regulating NHS 
Foundation Trust Hospitals. 
3. The third set of problems relates to the allocation of health resources and, in particular, to the 
imbalance in the allocation of health resources between towns and villages. In several 
respects this is not a problem of health policy but of governance and economic development. 
A major problem with government schools and hospitals in rural areas is of unfilled 
vacancies.  Even when vacancies are filled, however, there is the problem of absenteeism.  
Consequently, people in rural areas are unable to access doctors either, because of 
bureaucratic delay, the vacancies in their local health centres have not been filled or because 
the appointed persons do not show to undertake the duties they are paid to do.  So, reducing 
absenteeism is an urgent need to improve health access in rural areas. 
There is very little evidence that higher salaries lead to better attendance. Better oversight of 
health centres is a measure that could help reduce corrupt practices.  This monitoring could 
take the form of documenting the prevalence of ghost workers, strengthening inspections, and 
increasing the quality and volume of audits.  One option is the hiring of external personnel to 
monitor attendance.  This person can either reward workers who attend regularly or penalise 
those who miss significant numbers of days (Patrinos, 2013).  
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4. Then there is the issue of the accessibility of rural areas.  As the previous section showed, it is 
the areas which are the most remote that have the lowest density of health workers.  The 
average area covered by a PHC in India in 2016 was 122 square kilometres.17 The Indian 
Human Development Survey (Desai et al., 2015) shows that in 2014 the average distance in 
India of a place from a PHC was 5.8 kilometres but in the seven Northern-Eastern states it 
jumped to 10 kilometres.  Over and above this, the poor quality of roads connecting the 
remoter villages in India to larger conurbations means that the difficulties of traversing such 
distances are multiplied many times over.  In this context, rural accessibility to health services 
cannot be separated from the general developmental issue of improving infrastructure.  
Exiting PHC can be made more accessible if people could travel to them more easily. 
5. Then there is the question of a more efficient use of health workers in order to make them 
more productive.  One such initiative proposed to achieve this is task shifting. In this context, 
task shifting usually involves moving (shifting) clinical tasks from higher-level cadres, such 
as doctors to capable persons with fewer credentials. The WHO has also recently 
recommended task shifting to optimize health worker roles in maternal and new-born health 
interventions (WHO, 2012).  Initiatives have been taken across the country to train Medical 
Officers in providing comprehensive emergency obstetric care including caesarean delivery 
and anaesthesia (Paliwal et al., 2014). 
6. Lastly, Indian health policy is stronger on rhetoric and aspiration than it is on action and 
implementation.  The ‘rights-based’ approach of the two UPA governments from 2004-14 
was a form of governmental charity which guaranteed all manner of things like food, health, 
employment, without pausing to consider the implications for public finance. The successful 
implementation of policy requires the explicit recognition that objectives are often competing 
(primary versus tertiary care) and the acknowledgement that, with budgetary constraints, one 
cannot have more of one without having less of the other. The first role of policy is to then 
choose the optimal mix of objectives with respect to these trade-offs.  Secondly, policies 
                                                     
17 https://community.data.gov.in/average-rural-area-covered-by-a-primary-health-centre-as-on-31-03-2016/ 
(accessed 5 January 2018). 
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come up against vested interests which agitate (often with the support of opposition 
politicians) and litigate against proposed changes.  Attempts to regulate the private sector in 
West Bengal and Karnataka are examples; another example is provided by the opposition to 
the proposal to create a cadre of rural health practitioners, by instituting a degree in Rural 
Medicine (Paliwal et al., 2014).  Lastly, policies in India are made against a background of 
poor governance with the predatory presence of corruption looming over every policy 
initiative.  In implementing, rather than simply articulating, policy it important to address 
these governance issues. 
1.7 The Plan of This Book 
 The subsequent chapters present and discuss the results of the author’s research, using unit 
record data from secondary sources, to quantify various aspects of health outcomes in India.  Chapter 
2 examines both toilet possession and personal hygiene in India.  It shows that the strongest influences 
on households in India having a toilet were their standard of living, the highest educational level of 
adults in the households, and whether or not they possesses ancillary amenities like a separate kitchen 
for cooking, a pucca roof and floor, and water supply within the dwelling or its compound.  However, 
in so doing, it also shows that whether households had toilets depended not just on household-specific 
factors but also on the social environment within which the households were located. More 
specifically, ceteris paribus households in more developed villages would be more likely to have a 
toilet than those in less developed villages. The chapter rejects the nihilism of the idea, put forward in 
several academic papers, that the problem of open defecation in India is an intractable one because 
caste, ritual pollution, and untouchability instil in rural Indians a preference for open spaces. 
 Launched in October 1975, India’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program is 
its largest national program for promoting the health and development of mothers and their children. 
Chapter 3 examines an aspect of the ICDS program that has been neglected, namely who are its 
beneficiaries? Are they persons from deprived groups who, but for the program, might not have 
received such services? Or are they persons from more privileged groups who have the resources to 
acquire them from other sources? In both cases the ICDS program adds value but, in the latter 
situation, it does so by displacing existing services. This particular evaluation of the ICDS program is 
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particularly important in the light of the Government of India’s view, as articulated in its Eleventh 
Five Year Plan, that growth is not perceived as “sufficiently inclusive for many groups, especially 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Minorities”. The chapter presents econometric estimates 
regarding the relative strength of the personal and household circumstances of persons in determining 
the likelihood of utilising anganwadi services. Lastly, the chapter suggests a trade-off between quality 
and utilisation by hypothesising that the poor quality of services leads upper caste mothers to exit the 
ICDS market and seek these services elsewhere. 
 Chapter 4 examines child malnutrition in India. Even though the incidence of malnutrition in 
India has improved greatly since Independence, the prevalence of malnutrition in India is extremely 
high even relative to other poor countries. It is, however, more difficult to arrive at a universally 
acceptable explanation for why this should be so.   
 The contribution of this chapter is it examines the relative strengths of the determinants of 
child malnutrition in India paying attention to household characteristics (social group, consumption 
level, education, location) and the characteristics of the households’ dwellings (presence of toilets, 
separate kitchen, vent in the cooking area).  The analysis also examines the importance of anganwadis 
in combating child malnutrition through growth monitoring, health checks, and the provision of 
supplementary food.  In addition, a unique characteristic of this chapter is that it draws attention to the 
importance of personal hygiene, through washing hands with soap and water after defecation, as a 
prophylactic against diarrhoeal disease.  
 Chapter 5 uses data from India’s National Sample Survey (NSS), relating to respondents’ 
health outcomes between January and June 2014, to quantify a particular form of gender inequality: 
inequality in self-rated health (SRH) outcomes between men and women aged 60 years or over. In so 
doing, it makes five contributions to the existing literature. The first is in terms of analytical 
technique: this study contains a more detailed and nuanced exposition of the regression results than in 
previous studies. Second, it controls for environmental factors — such as poor drainage, absence of 
toilets, or lack of ventilation in the kitchen — which might adversely impact on health and, in 
particular, affect the health of women more than that of men. Third, it takes account of interaction 
effects by which the effect of a variable on an elderly person’s SRH differed according to whether the 
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person was male or female. Lastly, it examines whether SRH is correlated with objective health 
outcomes. In particular, this study answers two central questions. Did men and women, considered 
collectively, have significantly different likelihoods of ‘poor’ SRH between the different 
regions/income classes/social groups/education levels? Did men and women, considered separately, 
have significantly different likelihoods of a ‘poor’ SRH within a region/income class/social 
group/education level? 
 Chapter 6 evaluates the relative strengths of economic and social status in determining deaths 
in households in India. The first part of the chapter focuses on the “age at death” using National 
Sample Survey data for 2004 and 2014. The purpose was to ask whether after controlling for non-
community factors, the fact that Indians belonged to different social groups, encapsulating different 
degrees of social status, exercised a significant influence on their age at death. The existence of a 
social group effect would suggest that there was a “social gradient” to health outcomes in India. The 
second part of the chapter, using data from the Indian Human Development Survey of 2011, 
investigated the determinants of infant and child mortality. The overriding concern now is gender bias 
with girls more likely to die than boys before attaining their first (infant) and fifth (child) birthdays. 
As this study has shown, gender bias in infant and child mortality rates is, with singular exceptions, a 
feature of all the social groups. In conducting this investigation, the chapter addresses for India an 
issue which lies at the heart of social epidemiology: estimating the relative strengths of individual and 
social factors in determining mortality outcomes. 
 Chapter 7 investigates a neglected area in the study of human development relating 
differences in human development between social groups in a country. Failure to take account of such 
inter-group inequalities might lead one to exaggerate a country’s developmental achievements. 
Conversely, one would get a more accurate picture of a country’s achievements with respect to human 
development only after one had taken cognisance of the fact that the fruits of development were 
unequally distributed between its various communities.  There is a further issue. Not only are 
developmental fruits unequally distributed between groups, but these fruits may be unequally 
distributed within the groups.  This chapter uses the methodology of “equity adjusted achievement”  
23 
 
to compute human development indices and “extended” human development indices for a number of 
social groups in India. 
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 Table 1.1: Health Outcomes in India and Selected Countries 
 Life Expectancy at 
Birth, Years 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1,000 
births 
 1960 2015 1960 2015 
Bangladesh 46 72 174.9 28.2 
Brazil 54 75 128.8 13.5 
China 44 76 NA 8.5 
India 41 68 163.8 34.6 
Pakistan 45 66 190.7 64.2 
   Source: Development Data Group, World Bank 
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Table 1.2: Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on In-Patient Hospital Care  
 Number 
of 
Persons 
Total 
Expenditure in 
past 365 days on 
in-Patient 
Hospital Care (₹) 
Total 
Expenditure 
Reimbursed (₹) 
Out of Pocket 
Expenses as 
Proportion of 
Total Expenses (%) 
All Persons 57,144 17,165 4,129 75.9 
By Social Group:     
Scheduled Tribes 6,063 10,020 3,700 63.1 
Scheduled Castes 9,731 11,774 1,662 85.9 
Other Backward Classes 18,898 17,422 2,389 86.3 
Muslims 7,881 14,386 1,099 92.4 
Non-Muslim Upper Classes 14,407 24,972 10,144 59.4 
By Quintile of Monthly Per-
Capita Consumption 
Expenditure: 
    
Q1 (Lowest) 8,792 9,540 1,203 87.4 
Q2 12,006 11,967 968 91.9 
Q3 10,937 13,103 3,085 76.5 
Q4 12,884 16,395 2,477 84.9 
Q5 (Highest) 12,523 34,058 12,983 61.9 
By Type of State:     
Forward 30,867 19,159 6,065 68.3 
Backward 26,277 14,195 1,664 88.3 
By Location:     
Rural 30,970 14,030 1,460 90.0 
Urban 26,174 23,588 10,489 55.5 
Source: Own calculations from 71st NSS 
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Table 1.2: Financing of Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on In-Patient Care  
 Percentage of OOP expenses from source 
 Household 
Income/Saving 
Borrowing  Friends and 
Relatives 
All Persons 73.9 20.4 4.3 
By Social Group:    
Scheduled Tribes 78.7 16.6 3.3 
Scheduled Castes 69.8 24.4 4.3 
Other Backward Classes 71.2 22.4 5.0 
Muslims 73.6 21.2 4.2 
Non-Muslim Upper Classes 80.0 14.9 3.7 
By Quintile of Monthly Per-
Capita Consumption 
Expenditure: 
   
Q1 (Lowest) 70.1 22.2 5.9 
Q2 71.1 22.8 4.4 
Q3 72.2 23.2 3.5 
Q4 74.3 20.1 4.2 
Q5 (Highest) 81.1 14.2 3.8 
By Type of State:    
Forward 70.4 23.7 4.5 
Backward 78.9 15.5 4.1 
By Location:    
Rural 72.2 22.1 4.3 
Urban 77.2 17.1 5.5 
Source: Own calculations from 71st NSS 
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Table 1.3: Financing of Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on Out-Patient Care  
 Percentage of OOP expenses from source 
 Household 
Income/Saving 
Borrowing  Friends and 
Relatives 
All Persons 95.7 2.8 1.3 
By Social Group:    
Scheduled Tribes 96.2 2.5 0.7 
Scheduled Castes 95.4 3.2 1.3 
Other Backward Classes 96.0 2.8 1.0 
Muslims 93.1 1.7 1.2 
Non-Muslim Upper Classes 96.7 1.7 1.2 
By Quintile of Monthly Per-
Capita Consumption 
Expenditure: 
   
Q1 (Lowest) 92.3 4.4 2.9 
Q2 94.8 4.2 0.8 
Q3 96.1 2.5 1.1 
Q4 97.6 1.4 0.7 
Q5 (Highest) 98.0 1.1 0.7 
By Type of State:    
Forward 95.8 2.5 1.3 
Backward 95.6 3.2 1.1 
By Location:    
Rural 95.0 3.3 1.5 
Urban 97.0 1.8 0.8 
Source: Own calculations from 71st NSS 
 
